

Christopher C. Taylor
10/29/99

He Laughs with you yet he hates you: mistrusting Rwandan refugees

Introduction:

If the first casualty of war is truth, surely trust can not be far behind. For the refugees that war produces, re_establishing a capacity for trust is one of the most important factors in determining whether damaged psyches will ever mend, whether the walking wounded will ever rejoin the human fold. But trust is not simply an attribute of individual psyches, susceptible to psychological analysis and intervention, it is culturally constituted and thus variable in both quality and degree according to the particular group in question. In this paper I will examine the cultural construction of trust in Rwanda, a country where I have done several periods of fieldwork on topics related to medical practices and the body. After a brief discussion of how I believe the person is culturally constituted in Rwanda and the place of trust within this process, I will consider the centrality of the opposition of trust and mistrust that characterized the political culture of Rwanda as seen in events leading up to the genocide of 1994 and to which I was a witness in the final months of 1993 and the beginning months of 1994. Then I will discuss how the issue of trust has touched the lives of those Rwandan refugees whom I was able to interview after the genocide and those few whom I have managed to stay in contact with over the years since then. Two Rwandan proverbs summarize some of my thinking on these issues:

- 1) Your enemy laughs with you, yet he hates you.
- 2) The enemy, may he become a refugee.

Theoretical inspiration for this paper comes from Valentine Daniel's and John Knudsen's edited volume Mistrusting Refugees. In the Introduction the authors make the point that refugees are mistrusted by the host nations that are forced to accept them and that refugees' attitudes in the camps where they are placed are often characterized by deep feelings of mistrust. Although the mistrust that refugees typically manifest is a logical response to their environment, it constitutes a major impediment to the healing process. The capacity to trust requires the ability to gain affective, cognitive, and practical control over the forces of hazard and contingency, especially where there exists the possibility that in the chaos of events there exists the possibility that one might be hurt or killed. It is here that Daniel and Knudsen emphasize the social and cultural nature of trust, something which is molded by the unfolding of human life in groups. Theirs is a processual view. Culture is not a fixed cognitive armature, but an active and creative process of symbol making and symbol sharing. Culture operates effectively when it allows for a certain amount of indeterminacy, when it tolerates and promotes the novel and the creative, yet keeps this more or less in balance with a certain degree of predictability and systematicity.

Daniel and Knudsen employ the tools of information theory to describe an effective culture. For them such a culture is never in equilibrium. Instead it oscillates more or less felicitously around a median somewhere between the extremes of hyper_information at one end and hyper_redundancy at the other. The extreme of hyper_information is characterized by unpredictability, uncertainty, and sensory overstimulation. The extreme of hyper_redundancy is characterized by an overly regimented universe of rules and regulations. In these terms if refugees flee conditions of hyper_information, they often find themselves in camps characterized by conditions of hyper_redundancy that approach the carceral. These conditions may accommodate their wardens' need for security and control, but they certainly do not lend themselves to the refugees' need for psycho_social healing.

Where I would add to Daniel and Knudsen's insightful remarks is that we need to back up a little bit and consider the cultural construction of persons before they become refugees, and the place of trust and mistrust within this process. My hypothesis with regard to Rwanda is that the cultural construction of trust was becoming increasingly tenuous and contradictory in the decades before the genocide due to political_economic changes that began with colonialism and later intensified with commoditization of the economy. When the genocide occurred, the mistrustful proclivities on the part of many Rwandans were further exacerbated. Since that time this has impeded both national and individual healing.

The context:

Before addressing these issues, however, let me first turn our attention to the circumstances in which the genocide began and in which I found myself during my last period of residence in the country _ April 1994.

After the signing of peace accords that had held for about 9 months, hostilities between forces loyal to former Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and the rebel group, the Rwandan patriotic Front, resumed shortly after the President's plane was shot down on April 6th 1994. I was at home that evening in Kigali, Rwanda. I received a call at about 8PM from someone at USAID who told me that I had better not go out that night as there were rumors

to the effect that the president's plane had been shot at. At the time I dismissed the idea that something serious was amiss. My fiancée and I retired that evening at about midnight, but about three hours later we were awakened by the sound of gunfire and explosions. Shortly afterward, our house watchman came to the window and told us that he had just heard over the radio that the president had been killed and that everyone had been ordered to stay home. By the early hours of that morning, April 7th, it was clear that the truce between the two sides had come to an end and that all Rwandan Tutsi, considered supporters of the rebel RPF, might be killed as well. I feared for my fiancée, who was Tutsi, and for myself, so during the next two days whenever the violence seemed particularly nearby, we took shelter in the most protected corridor of our house placing mattresses against the walls, and beneath and above us. What was going on outside we could only imagine, but grenades and mortar shells seemed to be exploding everywhere. Finally, about sixty hours after the genocide began, my fiancée and I were emergency evacuated by land convoy from Rwanda to Bujumbura, Burundi.

We spent several days in Bujumbura and after that, took a plane to Nairobi, Kenya, where we resided for the next four months until mid-August of 1994. I met many Rwandan refugees in Kenya. In the first month or so of the genocide most of the refugees that I met were either Tutsi or Hutu opponents of the Habyarimana regime. As fighting continued between the interim Rwandan government and the rebel group, more and more of the refugees were Hutu and many of these latter were supporters of the former regime, although there was neither then nor now, a one to one correspondence between one's ethnicity in Rwanda and one's political leanings.

The cultural fashioning of the moral person:

From observations that I have made of Rwandan practices related to the body, I have advanced the hypothesis elsewhere that the making of the moral person in Rwanda involves the socially mediated insertion of the person into a network of acquaintances and kin in such a way as to facilitate the circulation of gifts and the reproduction of persons. The person is a relational entity in Rwanda always to be seen as involved in the dynamic construction of others and of him_ or herself through processes of giving, receiving, and reciprocating. Under the best of circumstances gifts and moral persons are not separate, persons and persons are not separate, but in both cases mutually constitutive. We make others through our gifts of cattle, food, milk, and beer, and they make us. The person is never whole, bounded, or complete; he or she is ever contingent, ever incomplete, always developing, never developed.

In many Rwandan cultural practices, emphasis is placed on the circulation of gifts among individuals and groups. In popular medicine, emphasis is placed on the movement of fluids and other substances within the body and these are seen to be affected by the processes of social life. The body and its health are contingent upon the orderly unfolding of social events, and upon the production and exchange of things that sustain the body in life. Subvert the circulation of substances among moral persons and you subvert the orderly flow of blood, semen, breastmilk, or even food through the alimentary canal in individual bodies. But the analogy is never uni-directional; the body serves as much as a metaphor to envision social life as social life serves as a metaphor of the body.

To render this more concrete, let us consider one Rwandan practice relating to childbirth. After giving birth a new mother is secluded for a period of eight days (today this period is often shorter). On the ninth day, the newborn child is presented to other members of the family and local community for the first time (*gusohora umwana*). Several of my Rwandan interlocutors during the 1980s explained to me that this rite of passage can only be performed after the baby's body has been examined and found to be free of anal malformations. People at this occasion receive a meal, especially the children present who are given favorite foods. These children in turn bestow a nickname on the newborn which will remain their name for the child. A few months later, the parents give the child another name, but the children continue to call the infant by their name. The meal given to the children is termed *kurya ubunyano*, which means 'to eat the baby's excrement,' for Rwandans say that a tiny quantity of the baby's fecal matter is mixed with the food. This appellation celebrates the fact that the baby's body has been found to be an 'open conduit,' an adequate vessel for perpetuating processes of 'flow.' In a sense, the baby's feces are its first gift and the members of his age class are its first recipients. The children at the ceremony incorporate the child into their group by symbolically ingesting one of his bodily products. Their bestowal of a name upon the infant manifests their acceptance of the child as a social being.

The affirmation of the baby's body as an 'open conduit' is a socially and morally salient image. If the body were 'closed' at its anal extremity, the baby would still be able to ingest, though not to excrete. The baby would be able to receive, but unable to give up or pass on that which it had received. In effect, its body would be a 'blocked' conduit. In social terms, such a body would be unable to participate in reciprocity, for while it could receive, it could never give. That gift_giving and reciprocity are processes that are constitutive of moral persons can be discerned from the term for 'man' in Kinyarwanda, *umugabo*, for it is derived from the verb, *kugaba*, whose

meaning is 'to give.' The construction of the moral person among Rwandans is contingent upon the social attestation that the person properly embody the physiological attributes that analogically evoke the capacity to reciprocate. This entails the capacity to ingest and the capacity to excrete, or, in socio_moral terms, the capacity to receive and the capacity to give. Consequently, two portions of the anatomy and their unobstructed connection are at issue: the mouth and the anus.

Illnesses treated by Rwandan popular healers are frequently characterized by obstructions or perturbations in the flow of bodily humors. They are often said to be caused by the malevolent actions of other human beings. Sorcerers act upon others by arresting their flow of generative fluids: they make women sterile and men impotent. They are also vampirish, anthropophagic beings who parasitically and invisibly suck away the blood and other vital fluids of their victims. In other instances sorcerers may induce fluids to leave the body in a torrent causing symptoms such as hemorrhagic menstruation, the vomiting of blood, projectile vomiting, and violent diarrhea. There are thus two basic expressions to symptoms in this model: 'blocked flow' and 'hemorrhagic flow.'

According to many Rwandans, sorcerers are motivated by envy. They may be envious of one's land, one's livestock, one's possessions, one's family, or one's social position. Sorcerers are people who produce themselves and not others. Sorcerers do not share. They are greedy and acquisitive. Sorcerers prevent their victims from enjoying their wealth in possessions or their wealth in persons. Sorcerers can cause the death of one's spouse, one's children, one's crops, or one's livestock. They are "closed" rather than "open" conduits and in some instances this metaphor becomes quite literal and iconic. In one Rwandan folk tale, for example, a sorcerer_like being who ends up causing the death of a revered king, is depicted as deliberately obstructing his own body by inserting irritating leaves into his anus. He does this so that he will not be called upon to offer himself in a ritual sacrifice to save the Rwandan kingdom, for the ritual demands a whole and healthy victim.

When I did my first fieldwork in Rwanda in 1983 _1985, I was struck by the fact that the fear of sorcery was wide_spread among Rwandans who consulted traditional healers. In one center for traditional medicine in which I spent 3 or 4 months, I was told by several healers that most of the people who consulted them suspected that their sicknesses had been caused by sorcery. They explained to me that in most cases their patients' disorders had more banal causes and that often they had to convince their patients of this. Envy and jealousy have also been noted by other researchers who have worked on traditional medicine in Rwanda and a close Rwandan friend and former colleague of mine, Emmanuel Habimana, devoted the entirety of his PhD dissertation in psychology to the subject of envy in Rwanda.

Of course not everyone in Rwanda consults traditional healers as many people in their conversion to modern commodity culture values have also abandoned traditional medicine. Even among these latter, however, their proclivity to attribute envy toward others is remarkable. Furthermore, the political economic process of commodification has only exacerbated the propensity to envy. A quick look at the Rwandan political economy of today shows why this might be so.

Consider the fact that Rwandan farms are quite small, just a little over two acres on the average, while the typical Rwandan household consists of about nine people. Virtually all the arable land in Rwanda is under intensive cultivation. From much of the land, two crop harvests must be extracted per year in order for the people to survive. Cash crops are also grown including coffee, tea, and pyrethrum flowers. Tea tends to be grown on large state_owned plantations, while coffee is planted by numerous independent small farmers. These latter are among the most poorly compensated for their product in the world.

Not every Rwandan farm consists of only two acres, however, as in the last several decades a rapid process of class formation and socio_economic differentiation has produced a small, largely urban bourgeoisie. These latter constitute less than 3% of the total Rwandan population, but they own most of the Rwandan farms that are larger than two acres and these take up about 43% of Rwanda's total area of arable land, 60% of the total in the central region of the country, Kigali Prefecture. Before the genocide many of the owners of these larger farms were military officers and/or wealthy notables in the President's political party, the MRND, prompting many to speak of Rwanda's elite as a 'military_merchant' class. Although some Rwandan entrepreneurs earned their position in this elite by providing needed products and services to the Rwandan economy, many others became that way due to their proximity to the organs of state power. In such a political_economic ambience, it is not surprising that envy and as a corollary, mistrust, were frequent social emotions.

It should also be noted that during the genocide, many of the 'genocidaires' were motivated more by the desire for land and property than by hatred against Tutsi. In some of the densely populated northern areas of Rwanda, where the Tutsi population has always been much smaller than in the south and center, thousands of Hutu were killed by other Hutu. The central motivating factor in these killings appears to have been land.

Stating this in theoretical terms, the transition to a political economy in which gifts continue to circulate but in which the commodity form has become dominant, has brought about changes in the way that the person is constituted in Rwanda. Whereas in pre_colonial times, persons embodied aspects of other persons from whom they had received gifts and were expected in turn to constitute yet others through their gifts, in more recent years, following commodity logic, persons and things have become more strictly separated. In former times where material wealth in the form of cattle or land was rather quickly converted into wealth in persons in the form of wives, children, and dependants, in an economy dominated by the commodity, this does not occur to nearly the same extent. People may accumulate wealth merely for the sake of accumulation or for luxury good consumption. Where there were once mechanisms by which wealth was redistributed under the former system, these redistributive mechanisms no longer operate quite as well, if they do at all. For example, the foremost re_distributor in the early Rwandan polity was the sacred king, and it was said about him: "He drinks the milk, milked by God, and we drink the milk, which he in turn, milks for us." Due to colonialism, by the late 1920s the redistributive and ritual functions of kingship had been irreversibly undermined. In 1961, the king and Tutsi dominance were overthrown as a result of the Hutu Revolution, but the king's role in the polity had long since lost its original meaning. By 1973, Rwanda was a totalitarian state run by a military dictator, Pres. Habyarimana, with patron / client ties to selected members of an almost prebendal bourgeoisie.

Capitalist development in Rwanda has seriously attenuated the importance of the gift 'sphere of exchange' although it has not completely destroyed it. This has complicated the making of moral persons in Rwanda. Whereas in the 'gift economy' flows of wealth are manifest and are harnessed to the reproduction of moral persons, under capitalism some people can sidestep the moral obligation to recirculate their wealth. They accumulate instead of recycling their wealth. They obstruct rather than keep open the conduits of exchange. For other people who continue to envision social life according to the logic of gifts, this accentuates envy and creates a general ambience of mistrust.

What becomes mystified in this process is the relationship between things and persons and as a corollary to this, social relations among persons. The gift sphere and the commodity sphere often become confused. One may believe that one is acting according to the logic of gifts only to find that the recipient of one's gifts never had any intention of reciprocating. But where the acquisitive person was once shunned as a sorcerer, in the post_colonial Rwandan state, such people drive Mercedes Benzes and own handsome villas close to the shores of Lake Kivu. To ordinary Rwandans such people are highly visible for they are the elite, but there are no longer either ritual or redistributive mechanisms for attenuating their monopolistic hold over resources. These are people whom one fears, but at the same time, one aspires to become one of them and one can only do that by taking on aspects of the sorcerer. When one knows the sorcerer that is in oneself, one begins to see sorcerers everywhere. Or, as Rene Gerard instructs us, the roots of violence lie in mimesis.

This rather telescoped analysis corresponds to what I learned about sorcery from observations of Rwandan healing practices during the 1980s. When I returned to Rwanda in 1993, many things had of course changed. The country had been through extremely hard times. This included a rather draconian structural adjustment program that sharply devalued the Rwandan Franc, a steep decline in the world price for coffee, drought and famine in some areas of Rwanda, and the 1990 invasion from neighboring Uganda by the Rwandan exile group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The level of mistrust that I had observed in the constitution of many Rwandan personalities during the 1980s had only gotten worse. The major difference between the 1980s and the 1990s, however, was that now members and allies of the Habyarimana government were opportunistically taking advantage of the situation to keep themselves in power, although to many outside observers the regime was already moribund.

To counter both the external threat posed by the RPF and the internal threat posed by democratic opponents of the regime, many of whom were southern Rwandan Hutu, allies of Habyarimana concentrated most of their attention on a convenient scapegoat, the Tutsi minority. It was true after all that 70 to 80% of RPF troops were Rwandan_origin Tutsi whose parents had sought refuge in Uganda during the 1960s and 70s. What the Habyarimana regime's henchmen conveniently ignored, though, was the fact that most Tutsi resident in Rwanda at the time of the RPF invasion were not supporters of the RPF. Instead of trying to enlist the support of Rwandan based Tutsi against the RPF, the regime did everything it could to push them into the arms of the invaders. It resurrected the old Hamitic mythology of Tutsi as pastoralist invaders from Ethiopia who had subjugated and infeodated the more peaceful Hutu cultivators. It also threw thousands of Rwandan Tutsi into jails and prison camps where they were subjected to human rights abuses.

Rwanda's media were conscripted into the regime's propaganda attack against Tutsi and against Hutu opponents of the regime, who were primarily members of opposition parties based in southern and central Rwanda. In the

charged political atmosphere of the 1990s, democratic opponents of the regime were viciously and salaciously attacked in Hutu extremist media. Extremist politicians also made public pronouncements stating that the anti_Tutsi massacres of 1959_62 had not gone far enough. Rwandan intellectuals associated with Radio Television Libre de Mille Collines or RTLM spearheaded the attack and they were quite effective. Behind the scenes Habyarimana and his lieutenants had other tricks up their sleeve. They set up dummy political parties that in reality were simply clones of their own party, the MRND. They also bribed and intimidated other prominent opposition party members and managed to split two of the most important opposition parties, the Democratic Republican Movement or MDR and the Liberal Party. Those that they could not bribe, they assassinated, such as MDR party member and writer, Gapyisi, killed in May 1993, and PSD party leader, Gatabazi, who was killed in February 1994. In the last few months leading up to the genocide the political atmosphere was one of complete mistrust. In squabbles among politicians, it was clear that the prevailing political dynamic was one where compromise had become impossible. Each political party was demanding concessions from its adversaries while offering nothing in return.

Yet there was also dissension in the ranks among the Habyarimana coterie; some of the most extreme among these depicted the president as 'soft' on Tutsi. There were also those who saw him as a capitulator in accepting the Arusha accords of August 1993, which promised a political role for the rebel group, the RPF. It is probable that the people who shot down Habyarimana's plane belonged to the more extreme contingent within this group. They knew that the chaos generated by this event would serve as an excellent pretext to begin the massacres in earnest.

Given the political ambience which preceded the genocide, and the propensity for mistrust that has characterized the entire post_colonial era, it is not difficult to understand that Rwandan refugees have been particularly afflicted. What they encountered in their flight from Rwanda only made things worse. When my fiancée and I arrived at Nairobi airport, for example, we met dozens of Rwandan refugees who had been detained at the airport for several days. The reason given by the Kenyan authorities for their actions was that Kenya was not allowing any Rwandans to enter the country. What was behind this was: Pres Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya had been an ally of Rwandan President Habyarimana and he was not about to let fleeing Tutsi or Hutu opponents of the former Rwandan government gain refuge in his country. It took several days for the UNHCR to work out a compromise with the Kenyans.

After a few weeks of getting adjusted to Nairobi, I began visiting Rwandan refugees at one of the places where they were being housed by the UNHCR, the Shauri_MoyoYMCA. Several of the refugees that I met there had been refugees for the third time in their lives: first during the troubles of 1959_62, then again in 1973, and finally in 1994. Several told me that in escaping from the 1994 genocide, they had narrowly avoided death on several occasions. One woman told me that she had been at her home not far from the Kigali airport when the genocide began. A day or so later Interahamwe militia members knocked at the door and when her husband opened it, he was immediately hacked to death by machetes. Luckily for her she managed to escape and hide. Later that night she crawled to the perimeter of Kigali airport where she was picked up by a sympathetic Rwandan army officer who took her to Belgian troops busily evacuating Westerners. Her example shows that even in the atmosphere of total chaos that characterized the genocide, it was still possible for some people to trust one another.

But for other survivors of the genocide, one of the recurrent themes in their stories was of trust betrayed. For example, one man, named Venuste, who had been an employee of the French cultural center in Kigali and who had been present at the center with his wife and two of his children when the genocide began told me that he had asked the French troops who had taken over the center shortly after the president's assassination to help him find his other two children. They refused. When the French troops finally decided to leave the center and Rwanda, he asked them to evacuate his family and him. Once again they refused. Shortly before the troops left, Venuste received a phone call from the center's French supervisor, and when Venuste repeated his plea for evacuation she calmly told him that maybe the RPF would take over the center later and then he would be safe. Venuste finally managed to be evacuated but only after Belgian troops took over the center a few hours after the departure of the French. As former allies of the Habyarimana government, the French did little to help their Tutsi employees. At the French embassy compound, for example, although Tutsi employees were pleading for evacuation from their former employers, they were denied entry into the compound. But, according to an eyewitness that I met at Shauri_moyo, inside the compound and about to be evacuated were dozens of people with close ties to the former regime.

The refugees at the Shauri_MoyoYMCA had a range of responses to all that had befallen them. Rather common was the reaction of intense religiosity. Following Daniel and Knudsen's terminology one could surmise that the pole of hyper_information that people had encountered in the events associated with the genocide had pushed them in the direction of hyper_redundancy. Many refugees asked themselves the question "Why am I still alive?" For some of the devout Christians in the group (Rwanda is predominantly Roman Catholic) the answer seemed to be that

they had been chosen by God to serve a higher purpose. Both at Shauri_moyo and in subsequent years, many Rwandan refugees have turned in the direction of pronounced Christianity piety.

For other Rwandan refugees, finding sense to life and learning to trust others again has proven difficult. When mistrust is compounded by grief, deep psychological problems can ensue.

One young Hutu woman that I met at Shauri_Moyo and who was from northern Rwanda, was just beginning to speak to other people again after months of catatonia. I was advised not to ask her about the events that she had lived through, due to the precarity of her psychological state. I have never heard what became of her. Among those that I have managed to hear something about in the years since then, some have sunk further into isolation and withdrawal, even to the point of paranoia. One woman with whom my wife retains close contact and who lives in England states that when she goes out to buy something, people in the store whisper derogatory things about her. She also claims that they talk about her case on TV. Yet doctors with whom we have been in contact about her claim that she is not seriously disturbed. To them she conveys an impression of adequate coping ability. She seems to know in what contexts she can give vent to her delusions. She feels that she can trust my wife sufficiently to air her paranoid fantasies, but when a professional actually tries to help her, she projects an entirely different image of herself.

Others that I knew in Kigali and met again in Nairobi have fared even worse. One man that I knew in Rwanda and whose wedding to a German woman I attended in Nairobi has since died, apparently of depression. Other survivors that I have learned about have committed suicide. One Tutsi woman that I knew before the genocide drunk herself to death several months after people associated with the RPF seized her house in Kigali. But there are also signs that at a grass roots level in Rwanda, some church and NGO groups have co_operated in providing a venue for Rwandans of different ethnicities to come together and to discuss the genocide. Recently I met a Rwandan woman associated with just such a group in the northern prefecture of Ruhengeri, one of the former regime's strongholds, and according to her the healing process has begun to accrue positive results. No longer does she feel that as a Tutsi her life is threatened in this part of the country and according to her, murders and kidnappings have been seriously curtailed. What she recommends is that Rwanda officially adopt something akin to the Peace and Reconciliation methods applied in South Africa.

Rwandans that I met recently in France, many of whom are Hutu and who left the country in the wake of the RPF victory or in the years following it, have a less sanguinary view of the situation there. To them and there is ample evidence to bolster their claims, Rwanda has become an ethnocracy yet again. Only this time with Tutsi in power. Although the President of Rwanda is Hutu and many of his cabinet ministers are Hutu, the real strong man of the regime is Vice President and Defense Minister, Paul Kagame, who is Tutsi. His closest confidants are also Tutsi. Many of the Hutu participants in the post_genocidal government, such as former prime minister, Faustin Twagiramungu, have long since fled the country. Moreover, several former highly placed Hutu members of the RPF have either fled the country or been assassinated. There is also ample evidence that tens of thousands, or possibly even as many as two hundred thousand Hutu have died in the eastern Congo or in northeastern Rwanda at the hands of Rwandan Patriotic Army troops.

conclusion:

To conclude what is a story without much in the way of a happy ending, a political culture of mistrust persists in Rwanda, as does a psychological state of mistrust among many of the Rwandans who now live outside the country. Part of the reason for this persistence is cultural. The person in Rwanda is not constructed in the same way under the post_colonial circumstances as he or she was constructed under the circumstances that characterized the pre_colonial era. Ritual mechanisms of redistribution do not work as well as in the past because most of these mechanisms have disappeared, yet the belief in and the fear of sorcery continues. Another reason for the continuation of mistrust is political_economic. With so little land at their disposal it is not surprising that the world view of many Rwandan peasants is a zero sum view, and that these people will sometimes resort to violence to obtain more land. Added to the land plight of Rwanda's peasantry, the new post_genocidal bourgeoisie in Rwanda appears to be as eager as its predecessors to amass quick fortunes. The continued involvement of the present Rwandan government in the eastern Congo, for example, appears to be as motivated by the gold and diamond trade in the region as by security considerations.

It is disappointing to end on a pessimistic note, but as long as there is no effort on the part of the present Rwandan government to resist falling into the patterns that have characterized previous regimes, it is difficult to see how Rwandans will break the pattern of see_saw violence that has marked the region for the last forty years. As long as Western governments, and in this case the United States, Rwanda's most powerful ally of the moment, continue to turn a blind eye to the errors and excesses of the present Rwandan regime, there is little likelihood that the latter will

see much advantage to changing their ways. One can only conquer mistrust with openness and candor and honest scholarship certainly has a role to play here. Until Hutu stop blaming the genocide on its Tutsi victims and until Tutsi stop justifying their counter_violence by an ideology of victimization, mistrust will continue in the region until one or both groups have been annihilated.